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ABSTRACT
Blockchain is a novel technology that is rising a lot of interest in the industrial and re-
search sectors because its properties of decentralisation, immutability and data integrity.
Initially, the underlying consensus mechanism has been designed for permissionless block-
chain on trustless network model through the proof-of-work, i.e. a mathematical challenge
which requires high computational power. This solution suffers of poor performances,
hence alternative consensus algorithms as the proof-of-stake have been proposed.
Conversely, for permissioned blockchain, where participants are known and authenti-
cated, variants of distributed consensus algorithms have been employed. However, most
of them comes out without formal expression of security analysis and trust assumptions
because the absence of an established knowledge. Therefore the lack of adequate analysis
on these algorithms hinders any cautious evaluation of their effectiveness in a real-world
setting where systems are deployed over trustless networks, i.e. Internet.
In this thesis we analyse security and performances of permissioned blockchain. Thus
we design a general model for such a scenario in a way to propose a general benchmark
for the experimental evaluations. This work brings two main contributions.
The first contribution concern the analysis of Proof-of-Authority, a Byzantine Fault-
Tolerant consensus protocol. We compare two of the main algorithms, named Aura and
Clique, with respect the well-established Practical Byzantine Fault-Tolerant, in terms of se-
curity and performances. We refer the CAP theorem for the consistency, availability and
partition tolerance guarantees and we describe a possible attack scenario in which one
of the algorithms loses consistency. The analysis advocates that Proof-of-Authority for
permissioned blockchains deployed over WANs experimenting Byzantine nodes, do not
provide adequate consistency guarantees for scenarios where data integrity is essential.
We claim that actually the Practical Byzantine Fault-Tolerant can fit better for permis-
sioned blockchain, despite a limited loss in terms of performance.
The second contribution is the realisation of a benchmark for practical evaluations. We
design a general model for permissioned blockchain under which benchmarking perfor-
mances and security guarantees. However, because no experiment can verify all the pos-
sible security issues permitted by the model, we prototype an adversarial model which
simulate three attacks, feasible for a blockchain system. We then integrate this attacker
model in a real blockchain client to evaluate the resiliency of the system and how much
the attacks impact performances and security guarantees.
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Introduction
Blockchain is one of the most disruptive technologies of the recent years. Firstly appeared
as a decentralised public ledger for the Bitcoin cryptocurrency [44], blockchain is nowa-
days widely exploited to a broad area of application domains. Its distinguishing prop-
erties of data immutability, integrity and full decentralisation are key drivers for general
purpose exploitations, ranging from Cloud computing to business-to-business applica-
tions.
Essentially, blockchain is a linked data structure replicated over a peer-to-peer net-
work, where transactions are issued to form new blocks. Peers achieve distributed con-
sensus on transaction ordering by placing them into new blocks; each block is linked
to the previous by means of its hash. Such block creation process is carried out by dis-
tinguished nodes of the network, named miners, according to a distributed consensus
algorithm. Besides cryptocurrencies a` la Bitcoin, miners can also run smart contracts, im-
mutable programs deployed and executed in a decentralised fashion upon a blockchain.
Ethereum [60] is the first smart contract framework of its denomination, whose transac-
tions represent non repudiable executions of smart contracts.
Blockchain systems like Bitcoin and Ethereum are called permissionless, i.e. any node
on the Internet can join and become a miner. Distributed consensus is here achieved
via so-called Proof of Work (PoW), a computational intensive hashing-based mathematical
challenge. PoW enjoys strong integrity guarantees and tolerates a sheer number of at-
tacks [27], but this comes at a huge cost: lack of performance. Moreover the PoW-based
blockchain achieve eventual consensus where conflicts between blocks are possible and
eventual solved later by some architectural rules, i.e. eventual consistency. This has led,
together with the absence of privacy and security controls on data, to so-called permis-
sioned blockchain, where an additional authentication and authorisation layer on miners
is in place. Examples of permissioned blockchains are Multichain [43] and R3 Corda [16],
(Hyperledger) Fabric [11] and permissioned-oriented Ethereum clients. Such systems
have prompted federation of companies thus to facilitate their interactions without giv-
ing out guarantees on control and computation of data. By way of example, the Cloud
Federation-as-a-Service solution [51] is exploiting a permissioned blockchain to underpin
1
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the governance of a federation of private Clouds [26] connected via the Internet.
Being the operating environment more trusted, permissioned blockchains rely on
message-based consensus schema, rather than on hashing procedures. In such setting,
dominant candidates are Byzantine Fault-Tolerant (BFT) algorithms such as the Practical
BFT (PBFT) [13]. Indeed, BFT-like algorithms have been widely investigated for permis-
sioned blockchains [56] with the aim of outperforming PoW while ensuring adequate
fault tolerance. Furthermore BFT-based blockchain offers, by design of the underling
consensus schemas, strong consistency on transactions despite availability. However this
shift to BFT consensus in blockchain comes with a set of challenges. Even if permissioned
blockchain promise to offer better performances, there is a lot of confusion around this.
Actually countless proposal have appeared, each one based on different ideas and
assumptions. Most of these implementations do not have exhaustive security analysis
and detailed documentations because there is not an accepted standard for consensus in
blockchain [12]. This poor informations generate ambiguity between current implemen-
tations and make difficult their evaluation and comparison.
Contributions
The goal of this thesis is to clarify the context of permissioned blockchain. We focus
on the underling consensus protocols and, by referencing the most general problems in
distributed computing, we propose a solution to evaluate security and performance guar-
antees in a general blockchain framework.
The first contribution of the thesis is the analysis of two algorithms for blockchain per-
missioned. The algorithms, namely Aura and Clique, belongs to a new interesting family
of BFT protocols, i.e. Proof-of-Authority (PoA), and promise to offer better performances
than the well known PBFT. Because the poor documentation, we understand the function-
ing of these algorithms through reversed engineering techniques. Therefore we analyse
their security guarantees, by referencing the CAP Theorem, comparing the results with
the well established PBFT protocol [2]. This work has been presented at the conference
ITASEC18.
The second contribution of the thesis is a benchmark proposal for permissioned block-
chains. For this scope, we firstly define a standard model for such systems. Thus we de-
sign an attacker model to outline the possible vulnerabilities and attack scenarios. Then
we propose the implementation guidelines for a Byzantine client, based on the attacker
model, which simulate in real systems the established attacks. In such a way we pro-
pose to measure how the attacks impact to security and performance properties in such a
scenarios.
CONTENTS 3
Thesis structure
In Chapter 1 we outline the context, by introducing the blockchain technology and the
most famous implementations. In Chapter 2 we introduce the problem of consensus
in distributed systems and in permissioned blockchains. In Chapter 3 is presented the
CAP Theorem evaluation of security and performances between two PoA algorithms and
PBFT. In Chapter 4 we introduce the benchmark evaluation, the system model for permis-
sioned blockchain and the threat model. Finally in Chapter 5 we summarise the obtained
results and we outline the future works.
Chapter 1
Background and Context
1.1 Blockchain Technology
Blockchain is a disruptive technology emerged in the recent years, firstly employed
within Bitcoin’s cryptocurrency [44] as public ledger. It is essentially a decentralised
and distributed data structure, replicated over a peer-to-peer (p2p) network. It mainly
consists of consecutive chained blocks, each one linked with the hash of the previous,
containing records. These records witness transactions occurred among participants (see
Figure 1.1), such transactions represents an asset exchange between the nodes of the net-
work, e.g. Bitcoin’s cryptocurrency.
Figure 1.1: Blockchain representation. Blocks reference each other by the hash of the previous
The process of block creation is called mining process and is carried out by special nodes
called miners, which periodically propose new blocks according to a distributed consen-
sus algorithm. In such a way participants achieve transactions agreement, share the same
state and guarantee consistency. Because decentralised and fully-replicated, blockchain
also deals with the necessity of trust in a central authority as the most general modern sys-
4
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tems do. There is not the necessity of a trusted third-party which controls all transactions
and manage data, indeed every node can independently verify the consistency of the
shared state. These important characteristic ensures data integrity and data immutabil-
ity, since any improper alteration (e.g. tampering) would be immediately detected and
rejected by the network.
Moreover, blockchains have the possibility to deploy and execute immutable pro-
grams, i.e. smart contracts, in a fully decentralised fashion. The first and most common
framework for decentralised applications was proposed by Ethereum [60].
Blockchain systems like Bitcoin and Ethereum are so called permissionless, i.e. any
node on the Internet can join the network and become a miner. In this case distributed
consensus is achieved via the so-called Proof of Work (PoW), a computational intensive
mathematical challenge. Conversely if there is an authentication and authorisation layer
for miners, then the blockchain is permissioned.
1.1.1 Public versus Private Blockchain
Blockchain systems can be classified on the basis of the access types in different permis-
sion models. Participants of a blockchain network have rights to: (i) accessing data on
the blockchain (Read), (ii) submitting transactions (Write) and (iii) updating the state with
new blocks (Commit) [33].
The work proposed by BitFury and Garzik in [29] and [30], define blockchain systems
on the basis of these rights. Specifically a blockchain can be essentially divided in two
main classes:
• public blockchain: no restrictions applied on Read operations;
• private blockchain: only a predefined list of entities is allowed to run Read operations.
Hence for the Write and Commit operations are identified two classes of blockchain:
• permissionless blockchain: there are no restrictions on Write and Commit operations;
• permissioned blockchain: only a predefined list of entities is allowed to Write and
Commit operations.
In permissionless blockchain anyone can join the network, execute Write operations,
Commit operations and, participate to consensus. Contrarily in permissioned blockchain
nodes are known thanks to an authentication mechanisms, and only these nodes can con-
trol the blockchain.
Table 1.1 shows a comparison between four blockchain models based on these classes.
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Read Write Commit
Public
permissionless
Open to anyone Anyone Anyone
Public
permissioned
Open to anyone
Authorised
participants
All or subset of
authorised
participants
Consortium
Restricted to an
authorised set of
participants
Authorised
participants
All or subset of
authorised
participants
Private
permissioned
Fully private or
restricted to a limited
set of authorised
nodes
Network
operator only
Network
operator only
Table 1.1: Main types of blockchain systems
Public permissionless blockchains, e.g. Bitcoin, operate in a hostile environment, re-
quiring the use of crypto-techniques to incentivise participants in behave honestly. Con-
trarily, private permissioned blockchains operate in an environment where participants
are already known. In this scenario nodes are incentivised to behave honestly because are
authenticated, so every misbehaviour can be detected and convicted. Consortium block-
chains are a special class of permissioned blockchain where memebers of a consortium
operate in a given context.
The private settings where participants are known and authenticated, make block-
chain platforms step away from their original purpose and enter in the domain of
database-replication protocols, notably, the classical state-machine replication (SMR) [52],
where only a predetermined set of nodes participate to the network..
1.2 Bitcoin: The Genesis of Blockchain
Bitcoin [44] was the first popularised application of permissionless blockchain for a vir-
tual currency. It is an electronic payment system based on cryptographic proof, which
avoid the need of a centralised authority, e.g. a bank. Current payment systems require
trusted third-party to process transactions, however this mediation is often subject to
transaction costs, limiting the minimum practical transaction size and cutting off the pos-
sibility for small casual transactions.
To guarantee machine-to-machine payments, the Bitcoin protocol uses a flood propa-
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gated p2p network that processes transactions in a fully decentralised system. Transac-
tion order is guaranteed by an hash based consensus mechanism. To maintain a consis-
tent, immutable, and therefore trustworthy, ledger of transactions, nodes share the Bitcoin
Public Ledger Figure 1.2, i.e. a blockchain with the list of all transactions ever made.
Figure 1.2: Bitcoin Public Ledger.
Transactions are managed by asymmetrical cryptograph as a chain of digital signa-
tures. Each owner transfers the coin by digitally signing a hash of the previous transac-
tions in input and the public key of the next owner and adding these to the end of the
coin as output. In this way only users which have previously received coins, can process
new transactions. In Bitcoin, every node has a balance of owned cryptocurrency coins
identified by the history of previous transactions.
When a node receive a transaction verifies the crypto-currency balance of the sender
by checking his previous unused transactions with its available balance. In such a way
only valid transfers are accepted. Moreover, Bitcoin protocol prevents also the double-
spending problem: in order to be validated, each input transaction is checked if used or
unused. Only unused transactions are accepted.
1.2.1 A probabilistic consensus: Proof-of-Work
To achieve consensus on transactions order over the blockchain and to prevent duble-
spending, Bitcoin’s network is based on the Proof-of-Work (PoW) algorithm. It consists in
a computational intensive hashing task. Specifically, to solve a block miners need to find a
random number (also called guess) which acts as a proof of work (see Figure 1.3); indeed,
such a number concatenated to transactions collected inside the block has to provide the
overall hash of the block less than the target number. The target number is regulated
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according to the so-called blockchain difficulty that regulates the average time spent by
miners to accomplish such a task and create a new block.
Figure 1.3: Proof-of-Work as a computational puzzle to solve a block
Once a miner solves a block, it broadcasts that block over the network. They consider
such a block as the latest of the chain and start mining new blocks to be appended on it.
For the sake of simplicity, we can say that once a miner has created a new block, it becomes
part of the chain. However if multiple miners concurrently add a block, a transient fork
is created which is usually resolved over time by concatenating other blocks as by design
miners always consider the longest chain. Miners are incentivised to correctly support
the network due to rewards obtained for successfully mining blocks and for fees that
each transaction can optionally acknowledge to them [44, 28].
When a block is part of the chain, it means that all miners have agreed on its content,
hence it is practically non-repudiable and persistent unless an attacker has the majority
of miners’ hash power. In such case the adversary is able to create a chain fork or re-
verse a transaction. Assuming a majority of hash power controlled by honest miners, the
probability of fork, with depth n, isO(2−n) [6]. Since the probability of forks decreases ex-
ponentially, the users simply waiting for a small number of blocks to be appended (e.g. 6
blocks in Bitcoin), can be sure that their transactions are permanently included with high
confidence (avoiding the double spending attack). However, in [22] the authors showed
as ”majority is not enough: Bitcoin mining is vulnerable” if only 25% of the computing power
is controlled by an adversary.
Although such systems provide strong integrity properties, PoW-based blockchains
have a main drawback: performance. This lack of performance is mainly due to the broad-
casting latency of blocks on the network and to the time-intensive task of PoW. Indeed
thousands of miners spread world-wide are required to render tampering with transac-
tions computational infeasible and broadcast blocks over this kind of network topology
takes very long. Thus as a matter of fact, each transaction stored on a blockchain has a
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high confirmation time, which causes an extremely low transaction throughput. In Bit-
coin, the average latency is 10 minutes, and the throughput is about 7 transactions per
second, while for Ethereum the latency is on average 10 seconds with 15 transactions per
second as throughput [6]. Moreover, PoW is energetically inefficient leading a huge waste
of money and resources to make the hashing computations.
1.3 Ethereum
Ethereum [60] is the second main project (open source) of blockchain, following Bitcoin.
It builds on the idea of smart contracts, immutable programs deployed and executed au-
tonomously on blockchain as transactions. It is featured by a Turing-complete program-
ming language which introduce to the distributed computation system that allows any-
one to write smart contract and therefore decentralised applications. This widens the
application domains of blockchain making it a computational infrastructure with any of
the participant in control of it.
Like Bitcoin, the shared state is managed by enrolled accounts which are featured
by a balance of the Ethereum’s cryptocurrency, i.e. ether. The ether is the main internal
crypto-fuel of Ethereum, and is used to pay transaction’s fees. Like Bitcoin, nodes run a
proof-of-work consensus to achieve agreement on transactions order and to maintain the
shared state consistent. Every time a transaction is accepted, the state is updated by the
Ethereum State Transition Function.
There are two types of accounts: externally owned accounts, controlled by private keys,
and contract accounts, controlled by their contract code. The first are similar to the classic
accounts of Bitcoin, whereas the others are allowed to allowed to read/write internal
storage interacting with smart contracts.
Messages and Transactions
Transactions, which in Ethereum are sent from external accounts, are quite similar to the
Bitcoin’s one. Two more fields have been introduced:
1. Gas Price: a scalar value representing the number of Ether to be paid for each com-
putational step of the transaction?s execution;
2. Gas Limit: a scalar value representing the maximum amount of gas that should be
used in executing the transaction.
In order to prevent accidental or hostile infinite loops or other computational wastage
in code, each transaction must have a computation limit on code execution. The unit
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gas setup a fee system in such a way is required by attackers to pay, proportionately to
every resource that they consume, including computation, bandwidth and storage; hence,
any transaction that leads to the network consuming a greater amount of any of these
resources must have a gas fee roughly proportional to the increment.
Moreover, Ethereum introduce the concept of message. Messages are produced by
contracts and essentially represent the call to a smart contract function. These are virtual
objects that are never serialised, they exist only in the Ethereum execution environment
and are sent by contract accounts. A message contain:
• the sender of the message;
• the recipient of the message;
• the amount of ether to transfer alongside the message;
• the Gas Price.
GHOST Protocol
Blockchains with fast confirmation times currently suffer of low security due to a high
stale rate. Blocks take a certain time to propagate through the network, e.g. if miner A
mines a block and then miner B happens to mine another block before miner A’s block
propagates to B, miner B’s block will end up wasted and will not contribute to network se-
curity by violating consistency: forks [59]. Moreover blockchains which quickly produce
blocks are very likely to lead to one mining pool, i.e. batch of miners working together
to get higher computational power, having a large enough percentage of the network
hashpower to have de facto control over the mining process.
In Bitcoin forks are solved by converging to the longest chain of blocks, indeed
Ethereum applies the ”Greedy Heaviest Observed Subtree” (GHOST) protocol [53]. Here
to calculate the main chain, also the stale descendants of the block’s ancestor (in Ethereum
jargon, i.e. uncles) are added to the calculation on which block has the largest total proof
of work backing it.
Figure 1.4 illustrates a chain selected by the GHOST protocol. Consider the block 1B,
it is supported by blocks 2B, 2C, and 2D that extend it directly, and include it in their
chain. Similarly, blocks 3C, 3D, and 3E support both 1B and 2C as part of their chain. At
each fork is selected the block leading to the heaviest subtree as part of the main chain.
In such a way every addition of new forks to a subtree, makes harder the omission of
the root from the main chain. Moreover to address the security issue of centralisation,
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Figure 1.4: Block tree where the longest chain is not the one selected by the GHOST protocol.
this protocol also provide block rewards to stales: a stale block receives 87.5% of its base
reward, and the nephew that includes the stale block receives the remaining 12.5%.
Ethereum implements a simplified version of GHOST which only goes down seven
levels. Specifically, a stale block can only be included as an uncle by the 2nd to 7th gen-
eration child of its parent, and not any block with a more distant relation. Calculations
show that five-level GHOST with incentivisation is over 95% efficient even with a 12s
block time, that is the time between the creation of two blocks in Ethereum compared to
10 minutes in Bitcoin.
1.3.1 Toward alternative consensus schemes: Proof-of-Stake
Ethash is the PoW implementation for Ethereum. Like in Bitcoin it suffers of the main
drawbacks of probabilistic algorithms. Thus, has been proposed by Ethereum the Proof-
of-Stake (PoS), with the Nxt cryptocurrency [15], as alternative consensus algorithm for
public blockchain. PoS employs a deterministic (pseudo-random) solution to define the
creator of the next block and the chance that an account is chosen depends on its wealth
(i.e. the stake). In PoS the blocks are said to be minted, rather than mined. Moreover,
generally all coins are created at the beginning, and thus the total number of coins never
change afterwards, but there exist some PoS versions where new coins can be created.
Therefore, in the original version of the PoS there are not any block rewards, hence the
minter take only the transaction fees [49].
In the Ethereum’s PoS implementation, called Casper [46], a set of validators take
turns proposing and voting on the next block. The weight of each validator’s vote de-
pends on the size of its ether deposit (i.e. the stake). The process of creating and agreeing
to new blocks is then done through a consensus algorithm that all current validators can
1.3. ETHEREUM 12
participate in. Two major types of consensus can be identified for PoS protocol:
1. Chain-based PoS: the algorithm pseudo-randomly selects a validator during each
time slot (eg. every period of 10 seconds might be a time slot) to propose a block.
The block is then appended to the blockchain
2. BFT-style PoS: validators are randomly assigned the right to propose blocks, but
agreeing on which block is canonical is done through a multi-round process where
each validator sends a ”vote” for some specific block during each round, and at the
end of the process all (honest and online) validators permanently agree on whether
or not any given block is part of the chain. Note that blocks may still be chained
together; the key difference is that consensus on a block can come within one block,
and does not depend on the length or size of the chain after it.
Differently from PoW, the PoS algorithms do not require waste of energy because they
do not need long computational periods. Hence the minting process is performed by coin
owners, putting money (i.e. a deposit) at stake. Here honest validators receive small re-
wards for making blocks but, security against malicious behaviours should be granted by
penalties. Indeed in this case, the costs of reverting transactions are hundreds or thou-
sands of times larger than the rewards that they got in the meantime. As the Ethereum’s
creator, Vitalik Buterin, wrote in a blogpost [9] :”In Proof-of-Stake, security comes not
from burning energy, but rather security comes from putting up economic value-at-loss”.
However many chain-based PoS algorithms are rising with a reward policy for pro-
ducing blocks without penalties [48] and this lead to the nothing at stake problem. Thus
this issue, in case of multiple chains, incentivise validators to sign blocks on every chain
since it does not cost anything to them. In this scenario a validator is encouraged to act
badly and creates as many blocks as possible leading to multiple forks and consequently
to double spend attacks.
1.3.2 Ethereum private networks
There exist different implementations of the Ethereum protocol, most of them offer the
possibility to be used in consortium chains for private settings. Two of the most interest-
ing Ethereum’s client are Geth [21], the Ethereum implementation in Golang language,
and Parity [55], a Rust-based implementation. Both of them offer, through special con-
figurations, the possibility of build permissioned private blockchain environments with
lightest consensus protocols.
These type of chains are used in development testnets where distributed applications
are tested and debugged before the deployment on the main Ethereum blockchain. More-
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over private networks, optimised for permissioned settings, can be also used for enter-
prise use cases where performance and privacy are important.
Beyond the currently PoW consensus, BFT-based algorithms can be employed in such
a scenario to guarantee highest performances. In the next chapter we will see which are
the most prominent algorithms and some of their use cases.
1.4 Hyperledger
The Hyperledger consortium is an ombrella project under the Linux Foundation that in-
cubate a large number of blockchain projects. Fabric [23] is the first released smart con-
tract, here called chaincode, blockchain system for permissioned settings. It offers a cus-
tomisable platform in terms of pluggable consensus mechanism, regulation on member
enrolment and visibility of data. Avoiding the use of proof-of-work prevents Fabric to be
used in trust-less settings, but its performance is remarkable and enabled a wide range of
industrial applications.
Firstly released under the most conform characteristics of a state-machine replication
system, i.e. release v0.6 [11], actually a more elaborate design has been adopted. The
last release Fabric v1.0 [25] separates the execution of chaincode transactions from the
ordering to ensure agreement and consistency. This new architecture promises to bring
better scalability. The fundamental key features of this architecture are:
• Channels for sharing confidential informations;
• An Ordering Service to guarantee transactions agreement and consistency, over the
network;
• An Endorsement policy for transactions;
• CouchDB world state which supports queries;
• A customisable Membership Service Provider (MSP).
At the beginning, the first release of Fabric had come with a native implementation
of PBFT [13] as consensus protocol. With the new version, the Ordering Service can be
provided by the Apache Kafka protocol [34], i.e. a crash tolerant pub/sub consensus and,
by a noops protocol, called SOLO, which essentially delegate the ordering to one peer.
Furthermore a new implementation of PBFT is under development.
Chapter 2
Distributed Consensus
Modern systems, evolved from centralised to distributed architectures where intercon-
nected computers, i.e. replicas, communicate and collaborate for a common goal com-
bining their resources, i.e. Distributed Computing. Replication in computing helps to im-
prove availability, reliability and fault-tolerance. There exists two types of replication:
(i) data replication, used in Distributed Database systems where data are stored across
replicas, (ii) computational replication where replicas execute the same computing task
many times. Furthermore replicated systems can be identified as:
• active replication: replicas process the same request;
• passive replication: each single request is processed on a single replica and the
result is dispatched to the other replicas.
The simplest active replication scheme is the primary/backup (or master-slave in the
database field) where a primary replica is in charge to order all the requests and dispatch
them to all the backups. On the other side, if any replica processes a request and then
distributes a new state, then this is a multi-primary scheme (or multi-master).
A fundamental problem in distributed computing is coordinating replicas operations
also in unreliable settings, i.e. Distributed Consensus. The most common paradigm for
implementing this type of services is the State Machine Replication (SMR) [52], wherein
a deterministic state machine is replicated across a set of nodes, such that it functions as a
single state machine despite failures. Replicas start in the same initial state and apply op-
erations in the same order. Considering the client/server paradigm, SMR systems ensure
resiliency against single-point-of-failure, contrarily to services using a single centralised
server. Clients submit operations to the replicated server system, i.e. transactions, each
one causing a state transition and return a deterministic result.
Blockchain is an implementation of a distributed database based on active replication
with a multi-primary scheme.
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To be feasible for an SMR system, distributed consensus algorithms must guarantee
two main properties:
Safety. This property states that the algorithm should do anything wrong during its normal
execution. This property prevent unwanted executions and ensure different properties like
consistency, validity agreement, and so on. If it is violated at some point in time, safety
property will be never satisfied again.
Liveness. This property ensures that eventually something good happens. It is a property of
a distributed system which grant that the algorithm works properly in time and that sooner
or later every execution completes correctly.
According to these properties different consensus algorithms have been proposed in
the last years. All of this protocols rely on different network models and guarantee cor-
rectness despite some fault model. The fault model and the synchrony assumptions play
a fundamental role for safety and liveness guarantees in SMR systems. Fixing a partic-
ular type of fault and the assumptions on network synchrony, one can characterise the
model by its resiliency, i.e. the maximum number of faults which can be tolerated in any
protocol in the given model.
2.1 Network models
Typically replication protocols, to guarantee resiliency, require an upper bound on the
time for messages to be delivered and on processor clocks synchronisation. In synchronous
environments these upper bound are fixed and defined a priori, therefore achieving con-
sensus results easy. However synchronous solutions are unfeasible in real environments
where networks can be partitioned, messages may be delayed or lost, nodes may crash,
may be subverted by an attacker and other unpredictable events.
Asynchronous systems avoid the necessity of any assumption about synchronised
clocks and timely network behaviours. Therefore protocols designed in this scenario
could provide the best resiliency to any type of fault. However due to a fundamental dis-
covery by Fischer et al., i.e. the celebrated ”FLP impossibility result” [24], which shows
that the existence of timing bounds is necessary to achieve any resiliency, is proved that
in this model, if even a single processes can crash, no consensus can be achieved.
The most accepted network model relies on eventual synchrony [20]. This simulates
an asynchronous network which eventually, after undefined bound in time, behave syn-
chronously and delivers all the messages. Protocols in this model never violate safety as
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long as the trust assumptions on the kind and the number of faulty nodes are met. During
the synchronous period, the protocol terminate correctly, guaranteeing liveness.
2.2 Failure Classification
Distributed systems can be subject to several issues caused by replication like random
communication delays and systems failures. These brings to the systems problems in
distributed consensus, and may cause the violation of safety and liveness properties.
In [17], Cristian et al. propose a classification of failures in several nested classes,
so that protocol’s complexity can be measured with the size of the class of failures it
tolerates. Failures are classified with respect to system components: a failure occurs when
a component does not behave in the correct manner.
An omission failure occurs when a component never gives the expected output to a
specified input. A timing failure occurs when the component responds too early, too late
or never to a request. A Byzantine failure [40] occurs when the component does not behave
correctly. More precisely a Byzantine fault can be cause by an omission fault, a timing
fault or if the component gives different output from the one specified. An important
subclass of this failure is the so called authentication-detectable Byzantine failure, where
any corruption of messages is detectable by using a message authentication protocol, e.g.
public-key cryptosystems based on digital signatures.
Figure 2.1: Byzantine failures model.
Figure 2.1 shows the Byzantine Failures model diagram where is explained the clas-
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sification of failures. Crash failures, i.e. when a component stops to work, are a subclass
of omission failures (Fail-stop failure is a special class of crash, where after a first omis-
sion a component omits to respond to all subsequent input events). Omission failures
are a subclass of timing failures, timing failures are a subclass of authenticated-detectable
Byzantine failures which are a subclass of the class of all possible failures, the Byzantine
failures.
The nested nature of the failure classes makes it easy to compare fault-tolerant proto-
cols.
2.3 Atomic Broadcast
The most relevant algorithm for SMR systems, for guaranteeing agreement and order on
requests, is the atomic broadcast (or total order broadcast) consensus.
Atomic broadcast is a reliable broadcast which ensures also that correct nodes output or
deliver the same sequence of messages, i.e. total order. Specifically it ensures the following
safety properties [31]:
Validity. If a correct node p broadcasts a message m, then p eventually delivers m.
Agreement. If a message m is delivered by some correct node, then m is eventually delivered
by every correct node.
Integrity. No correct node delivers the same message more than once; moreover, if a correct
node delivers a message m and the sender p of m is correct, then m was previously broadcast
by p.
Total Order. For messages m1 and m2, suppose p and q are two correct nodes that deliver
m1 and m2. Then p delivers m1 before m2 if and only if q delivers m1 before m2.
There exists several implementations of the atomic broadcast consensus, however a
fair comparison between each algorithm is still considered challenging [12] as some of
them require a synchronous network, while others can work in a eventually synchronous
network which may strongly impact performance and scalability. Therefore safety and
liveness properties in each model are guaranteed under different trust assumptions. Typ-
ically the generic trust assumption for a system with n nodes says that no more than
f < n/k nodes became faulty, thus the other n − f nodes are correct. For instance, in
SMR systems considering the simplest replication method, i.e. the primary/backup, and
the special fail-stop model, only f + 1 replicas are required by tolerating up to f faulty
nodes.
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Failure
Mode
Synchronous Asynchronous
Partially
Synchronous
Fail-Stop f ∞ 2 f + 1
Omission f ∞ 2 f + 1
Byzantine
Authentication
f ∞ 3 f + 1
Byzantine 3 f + 1 ∞ 3 f + 1
Table 2.1: Smallest number of nodes for which a f-resilient consensus protocol exists.
In Table 2.1 is shown the comparison of trust assumptions required for consensus,
considering all the failure models introduced before in different synchrony models.
All those algorithms can be categorised in two family: (i) Crash Tolerant and (ii) Byzan-
tine Fault Tolerant (BFT).
The main references for those families are (i) Paxos [38, 39], proposed by Lamport in
its original version only tolerant to a crash of t < n/2 nodes, and (ii) Practical Byzantine
Fault Tolerance (PBFT), proposed by Castro and Liskov [13], which is able to resist to
f < n/3 Byzantine nodes.
The PoW algorithm, even though is not related to neither families, can be categorised
as a BFT algorithm on a SMR model. Rigorously analysed in the technical report [1], it
is modelled in a network with a near-infinite number of nodes, with each node repre-
senting a very small unit of computing power and having a very small probability of
being able to create a block in a given period. In this model, the protocol has 50% fault-
tolerance assuming zero network latency (synchronous network), ∼46% (Ethereum) and
∼49.5% (Bitcoin) fault-tolerance under actually observed conditions, but goes down to
33% if network latency is equal to the block time, and reduces to zero as network latency
approaches infinity (asynchronous network) [46].
2.4 Consensus in Permissioned Blockchain
Blockchain is essentially a distributed database holding a list of records controlled by
a trustless p2p network. Actually the modern distributed database implementations,
e.g. DynamoDB [18], Cassandra [37], Facebook TAO [8], referencing the CAP Theorem,
favour availability and partition tolerance over consistency. Furthermore these systems
offer the concept of eventual consistency where replicas in a distributed database eventu-
ally converge to identical copies. Such scenarios address the scalability and availability
issues associated with strong consistency semantics, i.e. linearizability [32, 58].
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CAP Theorem The CAP Theorem [7] states that in a distributed data store only two
out of the three following properties can be ensured: Consistency (C), Availability (A) and
Partition Tolerance (P). Thus any distributed data store can be characterised on the basis
of the (at most) two properties it can guarantee, either CA, CP or AP. However, since
replicated systems may be subject to failures that can be thought as partition, partition-
tolerance must be guaranteed, thus only CP or AP systems are feasible.
Even if the blockchain system is a distributed database, it should enforce strong
consistency, i.e. atomic broadcast, among transactions, to prevent issues such as the
double-spending attack. However PoW-based permissionless blockchain cannot guar-
antee strong consistency because they run a sort of eventual consensus where forks are
possible and eventually resolved, i.e. such as the longest branch rule of Bitcoin or the
GHOST protocol in Ethereum. These systems do not guarantee atomic broadcast and
cannot be identified as SMR [58]. The eventual consensus in PoW (and PoS) leads to
favour availability over consistency guaranteeing only eventual consistency [46].
Conversely to permissionless blockchains, permissioned blockchains usually do not
employ cryptocurrencies and their purpose is more oriented to exchange of asset and
transactions. They can be faster by design, implementing a classical SMR schema. Here
the authentication of nodes changes the trust level, allowing thus to employ a consensus
schema lighter than the PoW. A report of Swanson compares the two models [54].
Hence blockchain are turning back to classical, strongly-consistent BFT distributed
consensus, based on atomic broadcast. These systems avoid the possibility of forks and,
in blockchain jargon this property is identified as consensus finality introduced in [57] (in
Appendix B is detailed the proof of strong consistency in finality).
Finality. Given two correct nodes n1, n2, if n1 appends a block b to its copy of the blockchain
before appending block b′, with b 6= b′ then no correct node n2 appends block b′ before b to
its copy of the blockchain.
Classical BFT-based consensus algorithms are strongly consistent, e.g. PBFT, and
guarantee finality to blockchains based on it. The most feasible algorithms for permis-
sioned blockchain belongs essentially to two implementations:
• Mining Rotation algorithm [29]. Distinguished nodes are in charge to seal all of the
blocks of the blockchain electing a leader periodically.
• PBFT (Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerant) [13]. Traditional Byzantine Fault Tolerant
consensus or similar.
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This trend of moving on strongly-consistent BFT-based consensus in blockchain is ex-
emplified by all the emerging practical systems which are rising. The most important
blockchain technologies that offer BFT-based distributed ledger systems are: (i) Hyper-
ledger Fabric with Apache Kafka [34] (i.e. a crash tolerant pub/sub) and with PBFT, (ii)
Tendermint [35] a BFT consensus protocol for blockcahin similar to PBFT, (iii) R3 Corda
with Raft [47] (i.e. a popular variant of Paxos, thus crash tolerant) and BFT-SMaRT [5] (i.e.
the most advanced and tested implementation of a BFT consensus), (iv) Multichain [43],
(v) Sawtooth Lake [36] with the Proof-of-Elapsed-Time (a.k.a. PoET, i.e. a novel protocol
based on the insight that PoW essentially imposes a mandatory but random waiting time
for leader election) and many others. An exhaustive comparison between different al-
gorithms employed by existing technologies among those properties is available in [12].
The work compares this technologies and their requirements in the sense of safety and
liveness properties. However from this study emerge a set of challenges.
BFT-based protocols proposed for permissioned blockchain guarantee strong consis-
tency but have to give up availability or partition-tolerance because the CAP Theorem.
Moreover a fair comparison between each algorithm is still considered challenging [12]
as some of them requires a synchronous network, while others can work in a eventually
synchronous network which may strongly impact on performance and scalability. Indeed,
this protocols are based on developers ideas, not relying on established knowledge on
blockchain. Most of them come without formal expression of their trust assumptions and
security model. There is not an agreed consensus in the industry and this generate a lot
of confusion in the public opinion [12].
In the next section we propose an analysis of two Mining Rotation algorithms against
the PBFT one, through the help of the CAP Theorem, to advocate liveness and safety
guarantees.
Chapter 3
Assessing Proof-of-Authority Consensus
for Permissioned Blockchain through a
CAP Theorem-based Analysis
Recently, a new line of research on distributed consensus is arising, as it plays a key role
in the blockhain ecosystem. In permissioned settings, dominant candidates are Byzan-
tine fault tolerant (BFT) algorithms such as the Practical BFT (PBFT). Indeed, BFT-like al-
gorithms have been widely investigated for permissioned blockchains with the aim of
outperforming PoW while ensuring adequate fault tolerance.
Proof-of-Authority (PoA) [45] is a new family of BFT algorithms which has recently
drawn attention due to the offered performance and toleration to faults. It is currently
used by Parity [55] and Geth [21], two well-recognised clients for permissioned setting
of Ethereum. Intuitively, the algorithms operate in rounds during which an elected party
acts as mining leader [29] and is in charge of proposing new blocks on which distributed
consensus is achieved. Differently from PBFT, PoA requires less message exchanges
hence provides better performance [19]. However, the actual consequences of such per-
formance improvement is quite blurry, especially in terms of availability and consistency
guarantees in a realistic eventually synchronous network model such as the Internet [10]).
To this aim, we take into account two of the main PoA implementations, named
Aura [4] and Clique [14], which are used by Ethereum clients for permissioned-oriented
deployments. In particular, the lack of appropriate documentation and analysis prevents
from a cautious choice of PoA implementations with respect to provided guarantees, fault
tolerance and network models.
In this chapter, we first derive the actual functioning of the two PoA algorithms, both
from the scarse documentation and directly from the source code. Then, we conduct
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a comparison with PBFT in terms of security and performances. Specifically, we con-
duct a qualitative analysis in terms of the CAP theorem, i.e., by assessing which ”two out
of three” properties between consistency, availability and partition tolerance can be assured
at the same time. Finally, we assess performances in terms of message exchange. The
analysis assumes an eventually synchronous network and the presence of Byzantine nodes.
The conducted analysis results that PoA algorithms favour availability over consistency,
oppositely to what PBFT guarantees. In terms of latency, measured as the number of
message rounds required to commit a block, PBFT lies in between Aura and Clique, out-
performing the former and being worse than the latter. These results suggest that PoA
algorithms are not actually suitable for permissioned blockchains deployed over the In-
ternet, because they do not ensure consistency, and strong data integrity guarantees are
usually the reason why blockchain-based solutions are employed. We advocate that PBFT
is a better choice in this case, although its performance can be worse than some PoA im-
plementations, thus their application may highly depend from the scenario.
Contributions. The content of this chapter has been published at the conference ITASEC18,
the contributions can be summarised as follow:
• we detailed two of the most prominence version of PoA algorithms by reversing
source code and online documentation;
• we proposed an approach to evaluate consensus algorithms through the CAP;
• we conducted such an analysis on the two PoA algorithms as well as on PBFT;
• we analysed performances of PoA and PBFT.
Chapter Structure. Section 3.1 introduces background concepts and comments the closest
related work. Section 3.2 introduces the PoA consensus schema. Section 3.3 analyses
PoA algorithms with respect to ensured guarantees and performance. Finally, Section ??
concludes the work.
3.1 Related Work
The most prominent consensus schema for consensus in distributed computing is so-
called Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT). Protocols of such type are able to tolerate arbitrar-
ily subverted nodes trying to hinder the achievement of an consistent agreement as we
detailed in Chapter 2.
The Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) [13] is one of the most well-established
BFT algorithms. However many other BFT algorithms have been proposed, mainly for
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improving PBFT performance; among others we can cite Q/U, HQ, Zyzzyva, Aardvark, see
the survey in [56] for further details of each solution.
The wide interest on blockchain has prompted substantial research efforts on dis-
tributed consensus schema, specifically towards new ad-hoc BFT ones. In [41] the au-
thor reviews well-known families of consensus algorithms for both permissionless and
permissioned blockchains. This includes Proof-of-Work (PoW), Prof-of-Stake (PoS), Del-
egated Proof-of-Stake (DPoS), Proof-of-Activity (PoW/PoS-hybrid), Proof-of-Burn (PoB),
Proof-of-Validation (PoV), Proof-of-Capacity (PoC or Proof-of-Storage), Proof-of-Importance
(PoI), Proof-of-Existence (PoE), Proof-of Elapsed Time (PoET), Ripple Consensus Proto-
col and Stellar Consensus Protocol (SCP). Although each algorithm is briefly described,
they lack of any form of analysis in presence of Byzantine nodes under an eventual syn-
chronous model.
Understanding the most appropriate consensus algorithm among the plethora before
is a challenging task that a few works have tried to tackle. For instance, Sankar et al. in-
vestigates in [50] the main differences between SCP and consensus algorithms employed
in R3 Corda and Hyperledger Fabric. Similarly, Mingxiao et al. extensively compare
in [42] performances and security of PoW, PoS, DPoS, PBFT and Raft. While, Tuan et al.
propose in [19] a practical benchmark for blockchain, named Blockbench, to systemati-
cally compare performances, scalability and security of multiple blockchain systems.
From a more formal perspective, Vukolic´ compares in [57] PoW with BFT-like ap-
proaches introducing the distinguishing property of consensus finality: the impossibil-
ity of reaching consensus without fully distributed agreement. In blockchain’s jargon,
it amounts to the impossibility of having forks. As expected, PoW does not enjoy con-
sensus finality (as forks can happen), while all BFT-like approaches does (all parties reach
agreement before consensus).
More related to permissioned blockchain, Cachin and Vukolic´ propose in [12] a thor-
ough analysis of most-known permissioned systems and their underlying consensus al-
gorithms in term of safety and liveness guarantees under eventual synchrony assump-
tion. This work introduces for the first time a structured comparison among consensus
algorithms, but it overlooks consistency and availability guarantees ensured by their us-
age; most of all it does not address PoA.
To sum up, none of the aforementioned works discuss the PoA consensus family. To
the best of our knowledge, we believe this is the first work tackling the analysis of block-
chain consensus algorithms from the perspective of the CAP theorem.
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3.2 Proof-of-Authority Consensus
Proof of Authority (PoA) is a family of consensus algorithms for permissioned blockchain
whose prominence is due to performance increases with respect to typical BFT algo-
rithms; this results from lighter message exchanges. PoA was originally proposed as
part of the Ethereum ecosystem for private networks and implemented into the clients
Aura and Clique.
PoA algorithms rely on a set of N trusted nodes called the authorities. Each authority
is identified by a unique id and a majority of them is assumed honest, namely at least
N/2 + 1. Consensus in PoA algorithms relies on a mining rotation schema, a widely used
approach to fairly distribute the responsibility of block creation among authorities [29, 26,
3]. Time is divided into steps, each of which has an authority elected as mining leader1.
The two PoA implementations work quite differently: both have a first round where
the new block is proposed by the current leader (block proposal); then Aura requires a
further round (block acceptance), while Clique does not. Figure 3.1 depicts the message
patterns of Aura and Clique, which will be detailed in next subsections.
block
proposal
block
acceptance
0
2
1
3
accept
(a) Aura
block proposal
commit
0
2
1
3
(b) Clique
Figure 3.1: Message exchanges of Aura and Clique PoA for each step. In this example there are 4
authorities with id 0,1,2,3. The leader of the step is the authority 0.
3.2.1 Aura
Aura (Authority Round) [4] is the PoA algorithm implemented in Parity [55], the Rust-
based Ethereum client. The network is assumed to be synchronous and all authorities to
be synchronised within the same UNIX time t. The index s of each step is deterministically
computed by each authority as s = t/step duration, where step duration is a constant
1For the cognitive, as there is no hash-based procedure like PoW, the consensus process is more appro-
priately called minting. However, for the sake of presentation, we will continue using the wording mining.
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determining the duration of a step. The leader of a step s is the authority identified by the
id l = s mod N.
Authorities maintain two queues locally, one for transactions Qtxn and one for pend-
ing blocks Qb. Each issued transaction is collected by authorities in Qtxn. For each step,
the leader l includes the transactions in Qtxn in a block b, and broadcasts it to the other
authorities (block proposal round in Figure 3.1(a)). Then each authority sends the received
block to the others (round block acceptance). If it turns out that all the authorities received
the same block b, they accept b by enqueuing it in Qb. Any received block sent by an au-
thority not expected to be the current leader is rejected. The leader is always expected to
send a block, if no transaction is available then an empty block has to be sent.
If authorities do not agree on the proposed block during the block acceptance, a vot-
ing is triggered to decide whether the current leader is malicious and then kick it out.
An authority can vote the current leader malicious because (i) it has not proposed any
block, (ii) it has proposed more blocks than expected, or (iii) it has proposed different
blocks to different authorities. The voting mechanism is realised through a smart contract,
and a majority of votes is required to actually remove the current leader l from the set
of legitimate authorities. When this happens, all the blocks in Qb proposed by l are dis-
carded. Note that leader misbehaviours can be caused by benign faults (e.g., network
asynchrony, software crash) or Byzantine faults (e.g., the leader has been subverted and
behaves maliciously on purpose).
(a) Step s1 (b) Step s2
Figure 3.2: Aura finality
A block b remains in Qb until a majority of authorities propose their blocks, then b
is committed to the blockchain. With a majority of honest authorities, this mechanism
should prevent any minority of (even consecutive steps) Byzantine leaders to commit
a block they have proposed, thus it guarantee consensus finality (Figure 3.2). Indeed
any suspicious behaviour (e.g., a leader proposes different blocks to different authorities)
triggers a voting where the honest majority can kick the current leader out, and the blocks
they have proposed can be discarded before being committed.
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Figure 3.2 shows how Aura guarantees finality on two consecutive steps. At step s1 on
the blockchain are committed blocks till bi, whereas blocks bi+1 · · · bi+ω are pending. The
block bi can be committed, since ω = k2 + 1 further blocks have been proposed after bi,
and thus the block bi achieved finality. Likewise, at step s2 the block bi+1 achieves finality
as the queue contains ω further blocks.
Summarising, the algorithm works as follows:
1. Nodes collects transactions in the transaction queue Qtxn;
2. For each step, the primary node seals and broadcasts a block to the network;
3. Nodes who receive a new block, verify its correctness and append it in the queue
Qb, waiting for finalisation;
4. When an epoch expires, each node examines the subset of all unfinalised blocks
from Qb. If a chain of waiting blocks has been finalised, than it is committed to the
blockchain. Each committed transaction is removed from the queue Qtxn;
3.2.2 Clique
Clique [14] is the PoA algorithm implemented in Geth [21], the GoLang-based Ethereum
client. The algorithm proceeds in epochs which are identified by a prefixed sequence of
committed blocks. When a new epoch starts, a special transition block is broadcasted. It
specifies the set of authorities (i.e., their ids) and can be used as snapshot of the current
blockchain by new authorities needing to synchronise.
a1 a2
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a4a5a6
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a8
(a) Time t1
a1 a2
a3
a4a5a6
a7
a8
(b) Time t2
Figure 3.3: Selection of authorities allowed to propose blocks in Clique.
While Aura is based on UNIX time, Clique computes the current step and related
leader using a formula that combines the block number and the number of authorities.
Most of all, in addition to the current leader, other authorities are allowed to propose
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Figure 3.4: A fork occurring in Clique. Authority a4 has the block proposed by a3 as second block,
while a5 has the block proposed by a2. Eventually, a4 replaces the block proposed by a3 with that
proposed by a2 because the latter has a higher score.
blocks in each step. To avoid that a single Byzantine authority could wreak havoc the
network by imposing a sheer number of blocks, each authority is only allowed to propose
a block every N/2 + 1 blocks. Thus, at any point in time there are at most N− (N/2 + 1)
authorities allowed to propose a block. Similarly to before, if authorities act maliciously
(e.g., by proposing a block when they are not allowed) they can be voted out. Specifically,
a vote against an authority can be casted at each step and if a majority is reached the
authority is removed from the list of legitimate authorities.
As more authorities can propose a block during each step, forks can occur. However,
fork likelihood is limited by the fact that each non-leader authority proposing a block
delays its block by a random time, hence the leader block is likely to be the first received
by all the authorities. If forks happen, the GHOST protocol [60] is used, which is based
on a block scoring approach: leaders’ blocks have higher scores, thus ensuring that forks
will be eventually solved.
Figure 3.3 shows two consecutive steps and how current leader and authorities al-
lowed to propose blocks change. There are N = 8 authorities, hence N − (N/2 + 1) = 3
authorities allowed to propose a block at each step, with one of them acting as leader (the
bold node in Figure 3.3). In Figure 3.3(a), the a1 is the leader while a2 and a3 are allowed
to propose blocks. In Figure 3.3(b), a1 is not allowed anymore to propose a block (it was in
the previous step, so it has to wait N/2 + 1 steps), while a4 is now authorised to propose
and a2 is the current leader.
Regarding the message exchange (see Figure 3.1(b)), at each step the leader broadcasts
a block and all the authorities directly commit it to the chain. By way of example, Fig-
ure 3.4 depicts a step where the leader authority a2 proposes a new block, as well as the
other allowed non-leader authority a3. The former block precedes the latter in the views
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of a1 and a5, while the opposite occurs for a4 and a3. The resulting fork (see right-hand
side of Figure 3.4) is easily detected by each authority when the next block is received,
as it references a previous block not at disposal of the authority. By relying on the scor-
ing mechanisms (i.e. blocks proposed by leaders win), the GHOST protocol resolves the
forks.
3.3 Comparison of Aura, Clique and PBFT
Previous PoA algorithms are here compared with PBFT, first in terms of consistency and
availability properties via the CAP Theorem (Section 3.3.1), then of performance (Sec-
tion 3.3.2).
3.3.1 Consistency and Availability Analysis based on CAP Theorem
Referencing the CAP Theorem introduced in Section 2.4, we refine the definitions of CAP
properties in the context of permissioned blockchains in order to delving into the CAP-
based analysis of the considered algorithms. Moreover we consider a system deployed
over the Internet, hence subjected to unforeseeable network delays of variable durations.
In the following, we then assume an eventually synchronous network model where mes-
sages can be delayed among correct nodes, but eventually the network starts behaving
synchronously and messages will be delivered (within a fixed but unknown time bound,
see Section 2.1). This model is considered appropriate when designing real resilient dis-
tributed systems [12].
Consistency. A blockchain achieves consistency when forks are avoided. This property,
as reported in Section 2.4, is referred to as consensus finality which, in the standard dis-
tributed system jargon, corresponds to achieving the total order and agreement properties
of atomic broadcast. The latter is the communication primitive considered as the relevant
type of consensus for blockchains [12]. When consistency cannot be obtained, we have
to distinguish whether forks are resolved sooner or later (eventual consistency) or they are
not (no consistency).
Availability. A blockchain is available if transactions submitted by clients are served and
eventually committed, i.e. permanently added to the chain.
Partition Tolerance. When a network partition occurs, authorities are divided into disjoint
groups in such a way that nodes in different groups cannot communicate each other.
Therefore, an Internet-deployed permissioned blockchain has to tolerate these adverse
situations: (i) periods where the network behaves asynchronously; (ii) a (bounded) num-
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Figure 3.5: Classification of Aura, Clique and PBFT according to the CAP Theorem
ber of Byzantine authorities aiming at hampering availability and consistency. The maxi-
mum number of tolerated Byzantine nodes depends on the consensus algorithm: N/2 for
PoA, N/3 for for PBFT. Since a blockchain must tolerate partitions, hence CA option is
not considered, we analyse the algorithms with respect to CP and AP options. The results
of this analysis are reported in Figure 3.5 and commented in the following.
Aura Analysis
Being based on UNIX synch time, authorities’ clocks can drift and become out-of-synch.
When authorities are distributed geographically over a wide area, resynchronization pro-
cedures cannot be effective due to network eventual synchrony. Hence, there can be pe-
riods where authorities do not agree on what is the current step and consequently on the
current authority in force. Clocks’ skews can be reasonably assumed strictly lower than
the step duration, which is in the order of seconds, thus we can have short time win-
dows where two distinct authorities are both considered as leaders by two disjoint sets of
authorities, say A1 and A2. This can critically affect the consistency of the whole system.
Let N1 = |A1| and N2 = |A2| (where N1 + N2 = N and N is an odd number) be
the number of authorities in the two sets, respectively. We have a majority of authorities,
say A1, agreeing on who is the current leader. This leads to a situation as depicted in
Figure 3.6: authorities in A1 = {a1, a3, a5} see steps slightly out of phase with respect to
the authorities in A2 = {a2, a4}. Indeed, the time windows coloured in grey are those
where A1 disagrees with A2 on who is the current leader. During time window W1, a2
considers itself the leader and sends a block to the other authorities. a2 is believed to be
the leader by the authorities in A2 but not by those in A1, hence the former authorities
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Figure 3.6: Example of out-of-synch authorities in Aura (each step for a set of authorities is
labelled by the expected leader)
accept its block while the latter ones reject it. During the time window W2, authorities in
A1 expect a2 to send a block but this does not occur because it has already sent its block
for the current step: at the end of W2 authorities inA1 will vote a2 as malicious and being
a majority they will force a2 to be removed. Therefore, all the remaining authorities inA2
will be eventually voted out one by one analogously. As A2 is a minority, its authorities
are voted out in a number of steps lower than that required to commit enqueued blocks
(see Section 3.2.1), hence there will be no different views of the chain and the consistency
is preserved. It is to note that in this case all the authorities are honest.
The same situation can affect consistency when authorities are Byzantine. Let us con-
sider a scenario where there are B malicious authorities, all in A1 and, differently from
before, they do not vote against authorities in A2. If B ≥ N1 − N/2, then a majority is
not reached to vote out authorities in A2, hence the blocks they have proposed achieve
finality and are committed to their local chains. This causes a fork that is never resolved:
if authorities are not voted out, their blocks are consider as valid and part of the chain.
Therefore, a minority of Byzantine authorities is sufficient to realise this attack and causes
no consistency in the system.
Indeed, let us consider a set S with an odd number of elements N = 2K + 1, and
a partition of such set in two non-empty subsets S1 and S2 with cardinality N1 and N2,
respectively, such that S1 is a majority and S2 a minority, i.e.,
K + 1 ≤ N1 ≤ 2K (3.1)
1 ≤ N2 ≤ K
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N1 + N2 = N
We want to prove that it suffices to remove a minority 2 of B elements from S1 to make it
become a minority. Hence, we want to prove that
∃B | N1 − B ≤ K ∧ B ≤ K (3.2)
Proof. Equation 3.2 can be proved by demonstrating that N1 − K ≤ K. This expression
can be written as N1 ≤ 2K, which is always verified because of Equation 3.1.
Anyway, transactions keep being committed over time regardless of what a minority
of Byzantine authorities do. Hence, Aura can be classified as an AP system, with no
consistency guarantees.
Clique Analysis
By design, Clique allows more than one authority to propose blocks with random delays.
This permits coping with leaders that could not have sent any block due to either net-
work asynchrony or benign/Byzantine faults. Resulting forks are anyway resolved by
the Ethereum GHOST protocol, hence we have eventual consistency. On the other hand, as
the mining frequency of authorities is bounded by 1N/2+1 , a majority of Byzantine author-
ities is required to take over the blockchain. This PoA algorithm can thus be classified as
AP, with eventual consistency guarantees.
PBFT Analysis
As long as less than one third of nodes are Byzantine, PBFT has been proved to guarantee
consistency, i.e. no fork can occur [13]. Because of the eventual synchrony of the network,
the algorithm can stall and blocks cannot reach finality. In this case, consistency is pre-
served while availability is given up. PBFT can then be easily classified as a CP system
according to the CAP theorem.
3.3.2 Performance Analysis
The analysis here reported is qualitative and only based on how the consensus algorithms
work in terms of message exchanging. The performance metrics usually considered for
consensus algorithms are transaction latency and throughput. In the specific case of per-
missioned blockchains, we measure the latency of a transaction t as the time between the
2A minority with respect to the set S .
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submission of t by a client and the commit of the block including t. Contrary to CPU
intensive consensus algorithms such as PoW, here we can safely assume that latency is
communication-bound rather than CPU-bound, as there is no relevant computation in-
volved. Hence, we can compare the algorithms in terms of the number of message rounds
required before a block is committed. Evaluating the throughput at a qualitative level is
much more challenging, as it closely depends on the specific parallelisation strategy (e.g.,
pipelining) employed by each algorithm implementation. Thus, we deem more correct to
compare throughput performance by the means of proper experimental evaluations that
we plan to carry out as future work.
We assess how many message rounds are required for each algorithm in the normal
case, i.e. when no condition occurs that makes any corner case to be executed. For exam-
ple, for Aura we do not consider the situation when some authorities suspect the presence
of subverted nodes and trigger a voting.
In Aura, each block proposal requires two message rounds: in the first round the
leader sends the proposed block to all the other authorities, in the second round each
authority sends the received block to all the other authorities. A block is committed after a
majority of authorities have proposed their blocks, hence the latency in terms of message
rounds in Aura is 2(N/2 + 1), where N is the number of authorities.
In Clique, a block proposal consists of a single round, where the leader sends the new
block to all the other authorities. The block is committed straight away, hence the la-
tency in terms of message rounds in Clique is 1. Such a huge difference between Aura
and Clique is due to their different strategies to cope with malicious authorities aiming at
creating forks: Aura waits that enough other blocks have been proposed before commit-
ting, Clique commits immediately and copes with possible forks after they occur. Clique
seems to outperform PBFT too, which takes three message rounds to commit a block.
Chapter 4
Benchmark for permissioned blockchain
In the previous chapters we outline the difficulty of comparing the rising BFT-based con-
sensus protocols for blockchain systems. These solutions should guarantee atomic broad-
cast for transactions order, to the detriment of availability or partition-tolerance. However
the evaluation of these algorithms is actually challenging in adversarial environment. In-
deed to be secure, a protocol should comes out with clear security model and trust as-
sumptions, under which the protocol proceeds as expected guaranteeing safety and live-
ness properties. Actually most of the modern BFT proposals for blockchain comes out
without these information, so is difficult to evaluate their employability.
In the information technology is well known that through the experimental evaluation
can be only demonstrated the failure of a system [12]. Furthermore, by simulating pos-
sible attack scenarios can be measured the resiliency against adversarial environments.
Thus, for the evaluation of blockchain systems (for the remainder of the chapter this term
will be used interchangeably with ’blockchain’) we highlight the need of a general pur-
pose benchmark who measure performances under the assumptions above.
In this chapter we propose the implementation of such a benchmark. We move to-
wards a formalisation of blockchain to define a framework for benchmarking and evalu-
ating these algorithms in a more formal approach. Concerning this, we define the eval-
uation metrics under which measure performances and security. Specifically, to evaluate
security, we identify from the general Byzantine model (Section 2.2) three most significant
attacks for a blockchain system to be exploited in the experimental evaluation.
To analyse the fault tolerance behaviour and hence the resiliency of the consensus
algorithms, we propose an experimental approach by taking a real blockchain client and
making it Byzantine. By monitoring the behaviours at runtime of the systems, we can
then evaluate the impact of Byzantine nodes in real blockchain systems.
Chapter Structure. Section 4.1 introduces the system model for a permissioned blockchain
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and the threat model for the benchmark. Section 4.2 introduces the benchmark and the
evaluation metrics for measurements. Finally Section 4.3 illustrate the practical imple-
mentation of a Byzantine node in a real blockchain client.
4.1 System and Threat Model
In this section is introduced the system model for permissioned blockchain. We assume a
partially synchronous communication network (see Section 2.1). A peer-to-peer distributed
system of authenticated nodes communicate over the network and keep a common state
update. This state is essentially a replicated data structure shared in memory between
replicas, i.e. blockchain. The blockchain is a collection of transactions organised in blocks,
it can be referenced as a ledger of blocks where each one is cryptographically linked to
the previous by means of its hash.
Figure 4.1: Example of blockchain network with six nodes which maintains the ledger. There are
four miners of which two possible leaders. There are also two clients which submit transactions
(bold arrows). Note that a node of the network can be a miner and a client simultaneously.
A transaction represent an asset exchange between two parties, secured by asymmet-
rical cryptography, while blocks are essentially collections of transactions with a deter-
mined size. In this scenario we identify two class of nodes, miners and clients. The clients
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are nodes in charge to submit transactions, while miners are responsible for accepting
correct transactions and collect them in blocks. We define the following property for the
transaction validation:
External Validity (safety) Verifies the correctness of transactions broadcasted through
the network from each client. Only valid transactions can be accepted by the protocol and
committed to the blockchain. The property has been defined as external validity by Cachin
et al.[?] and can be formalized as an external predicate V deterministically computable by
every node locally. This property can be formalized as follows[12]:
Definition 1. (Transaction Validation) Given a deterministic predicate V s.t. V→ {True, False},
and given two correct nodes of the blockchain n1, n2 s.t in atomic broadcast they have committed
the same sequence of transactions µ. Than n1 obtain, ∀tx ∈ µ, V(tx)=True iff ∀tx ∈ µ, n2 obtain
V(tx)=True
Figure 4.2: Transactions are Submitted by clients to the network. Then, once these transactions
are collected in blocks, they change the state with the relative block. Each block waits for consensus
in a Wait state or can be Refused. When the miners reach consensus a block will be Committed.
After the validation, each miner keep a list of pending transactions and create the
relative blocks to be proposed as next of the blockchain. While a block, and so the in-
cluded transactions, is not committed immediately on the blockchain, initially it is kept
in a waiting state. Thus, to guarantee atomicity on the transactions order, a consensus
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protocol is run between miners to establish the next block to be committed in the shared
state. We identify a special class of nodes, i.e. leaders, which are miners authorised to pro-
pose a block at a certain point in time. Figure 4.1 illustrates an example of our modelled
blockchain network.
When miners achieve consensus the current leader propose a new block. This can be
accepted and committed to the blockchain by all the nodes of the network, or refused
(Figure 4.2 is illustrated the life-cycle of transactions and blocks).
The blockchain system can be splitted into two layers. Miners of the network executes,
in a first layer, an algorithm for the collection of transactions submitted by clients and for
the management of blocks. This level is supported by a second layer which runs the
consensus protocol. This modules are connected each other, granting the execution of
transactions and the update of the shared ledger.
To formalise the functioning of the first layer we model the scenario described above
as follows.
Let B be a blockchain system, B :=<M,L, C, Γ,Ω, α, β > where:
• M is the set of miners
• L is the set of possible leaders, L ⊆M
• C is the set of clients
• Γ is the set of transactions
• Ω is the set of blocks
• α is the consensus algorithm adopted, it determine:
1. when a new leader is elected from miners:
– if the current leader is byzantine (PBFT);
– at each block (Mining Rotation);
2. the subset of miners which can be leader:
– all miners, L =M (PBFT);
– a subset of miners, L ⊆M (Mining Rotation).
• β : (Γ x M) → Ω, is a function executed by miners, which takes in input the
submitted transactions and return a new block.
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Referencing to the semantics defined, in the Algorithm 1 we propose the standardi-
sation of the first layer, where miners collect transactions and prepare blocks. This al-
gorithm rely on perfect links for communications and on a reliable broadcast module to
guarantee the correct delivery of transaction. Moreover the algorithm rely on a consensus
protocol module to manage the leaders’ proposals.
4.1.1 Blockchain Properites
The atomic broadcast is the most feasible consensus in permissioned blockchain. How-
ever, besides its fundamental properties (see Section 2.3), the peculiarities of blockchain
require the analyse of additional properties of interest. We list them in the following.
Given a blockchain system with a set of nodes such that: M := {m1, .., mi} miners,
and C := {c1, .., cj} clients, we identify as pending transaction tx ∈ Γ and a pending
block b ∈ Ω s.t. these properties are valid:
Integrity (safety)
• No duplication: tx is not committed to the blockchain more than once.
• No creation: If tx is committed to the blockchain, than it was previously broadcasted
by a correct miner mj.
Validity (safety) If a correct node commits a transaction tx to the blockchain, in a block
b, then tx is committed, in the same block b, by every correct node.
Finality (safety) In BFT-based blockchain, conensus finality is the possibility of encounter
forks during the chain construction. Roughly speaking finality is reached if all valid
blocks appended to the blockchain at some point in time, will be never removed from
the blockchain (see Section 2.4 for a formal definition).
Termination (liveness) For every transaction tx, if at least one correct node commits tx.
then all correct nodes (eventually) commit tx.
4.1.2 Threat Model
Assessing the security of blockchain consensus protocols is a challenging issue due to the
variety of attacks faced by blockchain system. Defining an attacker model is a first step to-
ward a comprehensive experimental evaluation of the resiliency of blockchain consensus
protocols.
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We model an attacker by identifying three more significant attacks for a blockchain
system. As an approach, we started from the Byzantine failure model [17] (Section 2.2),
where failures may occur or nodes may not behave in the proper manner because sub-
verted. Specifically, three classes of failures are there identified: omission failure, timing
failure and Byzantine failure. These classes are also specialised for sub-class of authenti-
cated protocols, likewise digitally signing a block or a transaction in a blockchain system.
Attacker model We assume a blockchain system formed by n independent nodes par-
ticipating to the consensus algorithm with at most f < nk , (k = 2, 3, ..) Byzantine faulty
nodes. We identify three attacks:
• (i) leader misbehaviour, a timing fault due to a miner broadcasting inconsistent blocks
at the same time;
• (ii) forgery, a Byzantine fault of a miner trying to forge fake transactions and/or
blocks;
• (iii) Denial of Service, an omission fault due to a miner avoiding the signing or broad-
casting of a transaction.
An attacker aims at compromising safety and liveness of an algorithm by exploiting these
attacks. Specifically, by referring to the evaluation properties reported before, we have
that (i) leader misbehaviour violates finality; (ii) forgery violates Integrity, validity and
external validity; (iii) Denial of Service violates termination.
4.2 Benchmark
In this section we define a general methodology to standardise the evaluation of per-
missioned blockchain systems. To benchmark such a system we should focus on the
underling consensus algorithm. Usually for the evaluation metrics of consensus the most
relevant properties to be considered are (i) performanceand, (ii) security.
To evaluate performances we consider throughput and latencies of transactions and,
scalability. Furthermore, because blockchains are asynchronous services [19], transactions
submitted to the system are not processed immediately. To measure the latency of trans-
actions we refer to the time between the submission and the commit of the block including
the transaction.
To evaluate the impact of the attacks listed in the system model, Section 4.1.2, we refer
to the following properties.
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Evaluation Metrics
• Throughput: measured as the number of transactions successfully committed per
second.
• Latency: measured as the time between the transaction submission and the commit
of the relative block.
• Scalability: measured as the changes of throughput and latency, increasing the num-
ber of nodes of the network.
• Safety: identified with the Integrity, Validity and Finality properties listed in Section
4.1.1
• Liveness: identified with the Termination property listed in Section 4.1.1
For each attack we propose to measure a sort of index-of-tolerance which identify how
the threat impacts the metrics, i.e. a performance breakdown or violation of safety and
liveness.
4.3 Byzantine client for blockchain
For evaluation purposes, whereas possible, we illustrate the best practice to integrate a
Byzantine client in a real blockchain framework. Most of these blockchain systems follow
a similar structure which covers the same (or similar) actors.
The Byzantine client we propose to integrate should simulate the attacker model given
in Section 4.1.2. Each attack impacts some properties and functions of the architectural
implementation.
We list below the best practice to follow for achieving this task and identify the correct
functions to modify in a blockchain framework.
1. Use the system logs to understand the the behaviour of the relevant actors. Specifi-
cally we suggest to use the trace level of the logger and focus on (i) transactions, (ii)
miners and, (iii) consensus engine;
2. Allow a blockchain client to run as Byzantine from the CLI. From the source code
add the flag option to the CLI manager;
3. Once identified the miner options, update their configurations to be prepared for a
Byzantine set-up. Indeed this functions usually manage the miner behaviours, i.e.
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the block creation, the block sealing and dispatching. Likewise a Byzantine miner
must be provided of specific functions to simulate the attacks above;
4. Update the consensus engine module which interact with the functions at 3. This
module needs to be prepared at Byzantine behaviours and, because it manage the
achievement of consensus, new functions for the possible attacks management are
required.
Currently we have implemented a demo of this Byzantine client inside Parity
Ethereum’s client. We simulate the denial-of-service attack forcing a miner to ignore the
block sealing procedure. For the implementation details we refer to the Appendix A.
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Algorithm 1 First layer blockchain
Uses:
PerfectPointToPointLink pl;
ReliableBroadcast rb;
ConsensusProtocol α.
1: upon event < Init > do
2: submitted := 0
3: waiting := 0
4: re f used := 0
5: committed := 0
6: BLOCK SIZE := k . Predefined block size
7: upon event < rb, Deliver|c, tx > do
8: if external validity(tx) then
9: submitted := submitted ∪ {tx}
10: else
11: trigger < pl, Re f used|c, tx >
12: upon |submitted| == BLOCK SIZE do
13: block tx = submitted
14: block = β(block tx)
15: submitted := submitted\{block tx}
16: waiting := waiting ∪ {block}
17: trigger < rb, Broadcast|sel f , block >
18: upon event < rb, Deliver|m, block > do
19: if veri f y(block) then . Function for block validity verification
20: trigger < α, Propose|m, block >
21: else
22: re f used := re f used ∪ {block}
23: waiting := waiting\{block}
24: upon event < α, Deliver|block, state > do
25: if state == accepted then
26: committed := committed ∪ {block}
27: waiting := waiting\{block}
28: else if state == re f used then
29: re f used := re f used ∪ {block}
30: waiting := waiting\{block}
31: function β(block tx) return Ω
32: for all tx ∈ block tx do
33: block := block ∪ {tx}
34: return block
Chapter 5
Conclusions and Future Directions
In this thesis we approached some techniques to analyse the permissioned blockchain
consensus protocols. Specifically we studied the security requirements relative to safety
and liveness properties and we analyse their performance guarantees. The thesis brings
two main contributions. The first contribution is a qualitative analysis of two consen-
sus algorithms against CAP (consistency, availability and partition tolerance) properties.
The second contribution is a formalisation of permissioned blockchains, for defining a
benchmarking framework and evaluating the consensus algorithms with a more formal
approach.
In the first contribution we derive the functioning of two prominent consensus al-
gorithms for permissioned blockchains based on the PoA paradigm, namely Aura and
Clique. We provide a qualitative comparison of them with respect to PBFT in terms of
consistency, availability and performance, by considering a deployment over the Inter-
net where the network is realistically modelled as eventually synchronous rather than
synchronous. By applying the CAP Theorem, we claim that in this setting PoA algo-
rithms can give up consistency for availability when considering the presence of Byzan-
tine nodes. This can prove to be unacceptable in scenarios where the integrity of transac-
tions has to be absolutely kept (which is likely to be the actual reason why a blockchain-
based solution is used). On the other hand, PBFT keeps the blockchain consistent at
the cost of availability, even when the network behaves temporarily asynchronously and
Byzantine nodes are present; this behaviour is much more desirable when data integrity
is a priority. Despite one of the most praised advantages of PoA algorithms is their perfor-
mance, our qualitative analysis shows that in terms of latency the expected loss of PBFT
is bounded, and can be offset by the gain in consistency guarantees.
In the second contribution we detailed a formal model for permissioned blockchain.
Specifically we outline the most general model for such a scenario, to be as feasible as
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possible in real context. We assume a partially synchronous network which is subject
to the most general Byzantine fault model. Thus we profile a possible attacker model
that can be exploited over a blockchain network. To measure security, we assess the
evaluation metrics in correct behaviour and under the attacks listed in the system model,
Section 4.1.2. Specifically we propose to evaluate the impact of the attacks to the specified
evaluation metrics, and for this purpose we integrate a first prototype of a Byzantine
client node in a real blockchain, i.e. Parity.
As future work, we plan to deepen the analysis of PoA algorithms by engaging fur-
ther reverse engineering tasks and thorough experimental evaluations. The final goal is
to validate and possible revise our claims on the availability and consistency guarantees
of PoA and PBFT, by implementing the adverse scenarios we envisioned in Section 3.3.1.
Furthermore with the specified benchmark guidelines, we want to create a real bench-
marking architecture to collect performance measurements, both transaction latency and
throughput, and to test scalability with respect to varying input transaction rates and
number of nodes/authorities. For this purpose we aim to experiment the consensus tech-
nologies by testing the impact of the Byzantine client in consensus algorithms and out-
line an evaluation metric for security, i.e. index-of-tolerance, to measure how a specific
algorithm is resilient to an adversarial context.
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”Life is what happens to you while you are making other plans.”
John Lennon
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45
Appendix A
Parity Byzantine client
We propose the integration of a Byzantine client in Parity blockchain. It is the Ethereum’s
client based on the programming language Rust. Beyond the possibility of create a proper
client on the public Ethereum blockchain, Parity offers the possibility to realise private
permissioned blockchain based on lighter consensus engines. We integrate our client
following the steps in Section 4.3. Here we show the implementation details for each of
the steps.
First of all, once identified the flow of transactions and miners we integrate the pos-
sibility of run a node as Byzantine by updating the configurations of the CLI. More pre-
cisely we add the boolean flag byzantine by updating the file at ∼ parity/cli/mod.rs
as follows.
 
...
// -- Sealing/Mining Options
flag_stratum: bool = false ,
or |c: &Config| Some(c.stratum.is_some ()),
flag_stratum_interface: String = "local",
or |c: &Config| otry!(c.stratum).interface.clone(),
flag_stratum_port: u16 = 8008u16 ,
or |c: &Config| otry!(c.stratum).port.clone(),
flag_stratum_secret: Option <String > = None ,
or |c: &Config| otry!(c.stratum).secret.clone().map(Some),
flag_byzantine: bool = false ,
or |c: &Config| otry!(c.mining).byzantine.clone()
... 
Listing A.1: Byzantine Flag integration.
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 
...
struct Mining {
author: Option <String >,
engine_signer: Option <String >,
force_sealing: Option <bool >,
reseal_on_uncle: Option <bool >,
reseal_on_txs: Option <String >,
reseal_min_period: Option <u64 >,
...
...
tx_queue_strategy: Option <String >,
tx_queue_ban_count: Option <u16 >,
tx_queue_ban_time: Option <u16 >,
remove_solved: Option <bool >,
notify_work: Option <Vec <String >>,
refuse_service_transactions: Option <bool >,
byzantine: Option <bool >,
}
... 
Listing A.2: Byzantine Flag for Mining options.
Then to update the miners configurations we load the byzantine flag in the miner options()
functions at line 517 of the file ∼parity/configuration.rs adding the following option:
 
byzantine: self.args.flag_byzantine , 
hence we add the required miner configurations by editing the file at
∼ethcore/src/miner/miner.rs as follows.
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 
...
pub struct MinerOptions {
pub new_work_notify: Vec <String >,
/// Byzantine node.
pub byzantine: bool ,
/// Force the miner to reseal , even when nobody has asked for work
pub force_sealing: bool ,
...
...
pub tx_queue_gas_limit: GasLimit ,
pub tx_queue_banning: Banning ,
pub refuse_service_transactions: bool ,
}
... 
Listing A.3: Miner behaviour configurations.
 
...
impl Default for MinerOptions {
fn default () -> Self {
MinerOptions {
new_work_notify: vec![],
byzantine: false ,
force_sealing: false ,
...
...
tx_queue_banning: Banning ::Disabled ,
refuse_service_transactions: false ,
}
}
}
... 
Listing A.4: Miner default behaviour configurations.
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 
...
fn is_byzantine (&self) -> bool {
self.options.byzantine || !self.notifiers.read().is_empty ()
}
...
...
/// Attempts to perform internal sealing (one that does not require
work) and handles the result depending on the type of Seal.
fn seal_and_import_block_internally (&self , chain: &
MiningBlockChainClient , block: ClosedBlock) -> bool {
if !block.transactions ().is_empty () || self.forced_sealing () ||
Instant ::now() > *self.next_mandatory_reseal.read() {
trace !( target: "miner", "seal_block_internally: attempting
internal seal.");
// ADD IF CONDITION FOR match with byzantine (controll with
function self.is_byzantine ())
let seal_function = if self.is_byzantine () {
self.engine.generate_seal_byzantine(block.block())
} else {
self.engine.generate_seal(block.block())
};
...
... 
Listing A.5: Byzantine function notifier and If statement for Byzantine client.
Once implemented the miner options we update the consensus engine, to simulate the
DoS attack. Because Parity provide the possibility to integrate different consensus engines
we firstly add the generic function to the interface (∼ethcore/src/engines/mod.rs) and
then we implement this function in our reference consensus, i.e. Aura Proof-of-Authority.
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 
...
/// Byzantine seal. No blocks will be sealed.
/// Edited by @StefanoDeAngelis.
fn generate_seal_byzantine (&self , block: &ExecutedBlock) -> Seal {
if !self.can_propose.load(AtomicOrdering :: SeqCst) { return Seal::
None; }
let header = block.header ();
let step = self.step.load();
let active_set;
...
...
if is_step_proposer(validators , header.parent_hash (), step , header
.author ()) {
trace!( target: "engine", "generate_seal: Byzantine proposer for
step {}. No block sealed.", step);
} else {
trace!( target: "engine", "generate_seal: {} not a proposer for
step {}.",
header.author (), step);
}
Seal::None
}
... 
Listing A.6: Byzantine sealing function. Exploitation of DoS attack.
Appendix B
Consensus Finality
Consensus Finality guarantees strong consistency on blockchain among replicas. Essen-
tially it describes the possibility of having forks. In distributed systems is proved that
for guaranteeing strong consistency two properties are required: agreement and total or-
der. For demonstrating that finality strictly implies strong consistency, we reproduce two
scenarios of forks which differently violates agreement and total order.
(a) No Agreement (b) No Total Order
Figure B.1: Fork scenarios that violate agreement and total order.
We consider two correct nodes p and q, which hold a blockchain. In Figure B.1(a)
agreement is not guaranteed because q have different blocks to the blockchain with re-
spect to p. Indeed Figure B.1(b) shows a case in which total order is violated, nodes have
the same blocks but with different order. In both scenarios there is a fork between the
blockchains of the two participants that violate consequently the finality property. There-
fore we can define the following theorem:
Theorem 1. A blockchain system achieve finality if and only if agreement and total order proper-
ties are guaranteed.
Corollary 1. If a blockchain system do not achieve finality, it can only guarantee eventual consis-
tency.
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